By Alex Goodale
President, Florida Space Coast Chapter of CIRA
CIRA Newsletter Editor
(Central Intelligence Retirees Association)
First published in CIRA Quarterly Newsletter, Summer 2022
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As many CIRAns are aware, our former colleague, Bob Baer, has recently authored a new book, “The Fourth Man.”
In essence, it tells the story of a counterintelligence (CI) investigation in 1 994, following the arrest that February of the traitor, Rick Ames. The purpose of this CI investigation was to explore the possibility of another mole in CIA, specifically in the DO’s Soviet-East European (SE) Division–renamed Central Eurasia (CE) Division following the collapse of the USSR in late 1991. There were various anomalies, as well as some information from a KGB source, which seemed to point to this possibility.
Mr. Baer indicates that he took on the task of telling the untold story of this investigation at the behest of his friend and former boss, who served as CE Division Chief 1994-96 and was privy to the CI investigation.
Mr. Baer’s new book has been met with kudos from some, mostly in the publishing and media business, and mostly brickbats from intelligence professionals. I am definitely in the latter camp, and will not repeat here the excellent reviews by my colleagues Joe Augustyn and Tony Jordan. Rather, I would like to take a different approach in dealing with this book, to offer my fellow CIRAns some observations from both personal and professional perspectives.
By way of background, I was a Soviet specialist (Russian history and language) and served in SE-CE 13 years (1981-1994), mostly in Reports, interspersed with some interesting ops assignments in the domestic and foreign field. I worked with most of the protagonists in Mr. Baer’s book, including some of the FBI officers.
First, a professional observation. In the Epilogue of the ‘Fourth Man,’ Mr. Baer makes a key point, which seriously undercuts the case for a ‘Fourth Man,’ particularly one as highly placed as his primary suspect, who served as DC/SE in the late 1980s, before moving to CI in the early 1990s. Namely, there were few clear-cut compromises, no demonstrable damage, which could be tied to the ‘Fourth Man’–unlike the terrible agent losses we suffered in 1985-86.
I would note that, as Milt Bearden made clear in his book, “The Main Enemy,” SE had a number of stunning, highly productive cases in the 1989-91 timeframe, with no indications of compromise. Ames didn’t have access to those cases; but the primary suspect did, and no damage resulted.
I find that passing strange, if there was indeed a ‘Fourth Man,’ as intelligence services evaluate their sources’ worth and bonafides in part by the damage they inflict on their intelligence targets. One could make the argument that the KGB might have put the ‘Fourth Man’ on ice, saving him for more important tasks, but that certainly wasn’t evident in their handling of Ames.
Second, a personal observation. I got to know the primary suspect fairly well, especially when he became DC/SE. Both in word and deed, I observed him attacking the Soviet intelligence services with utter determination, if not Jesuitical zeal. That same determination was evident in his subsequent leadership of the Ames Investigation and of the Agency’s broader counterintelligence program.
It was also evident early one Fall morning in 1988, when DC/SE called me into his office, along with a good friend and colleague (Ed). He informed us that a Soviet agent, who I had met and debriefed in 1985, had just called in for a meeting. It was particularly significant, because he was the first of our Soviet agents to signal for meeting, since we put them on ice just months after I had met him in 1985. DC/SE said that he had read a memo I wrote after the 1985 meeting, in which I outlined specific concerns that the agent might be a double, although he was a long- time source of ours. He agreed with my concerns, and said to Ed and me, “Now, go prove it!” We did precisely that, and also identified his probable KGB handling officer on the street. We reported back to DC/SE, who was visibly delighted with our success.
I subsequently worked directly for him throughout 1989 in the domestic field, teamed with FBI counterintelligence officers. Again, his zeal in getting after the Soviet intelligence services was readily apparent to me. Consequently, I have a very hard time squaring my observations of him with Bob Baer’s book.
I also found unseemly, even vengeful, when I read the way Mr. Baer’s friend and former boss in 2019 identified the primary suspect by name and challenged Mr. Baer to investigate the Fourth Man in hopes of making him “pay the piper in the currency of sleepless nights.” For me, at least, it smacked-of an ulterior motive.
In closing, I found “The Fourth Man” to be neither good history nor sound intelligence analysis. Rather, it’s a rambling journey, reminiscent of another journey of Bob Baer’s in South America, searching for traces of Adolf Hitler having taken refuge there. Caveat emptor!