Ms. Bannerman’s January 1995 Briefing for Deputy Director for Operations Ted Price
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Ms. Bannerman claimed when she briefed Ted Price—the Deputy Director of Operations and Mr. Redmond’s superior—in January 1995 about the Matrix, “He also understood that it didn’t prove the guilt or innocence of anyone. Redmond’s name was never mentioned but it was clear that Price understood he alone fit the profile SIU had constructed.” (Pg 192)
Ms. Bannerman again makes an assumption about what she claims she thought was in someone’s head but was never spoken or acted upon. This is not credible and in fact is ridiculous on its face knowing Mr. Price and the intensity of CI focus on the espionage leads at the time.
The Counterintelligence Center and the Counterespionage management team led by Mr. Curran regularly met with and briefed select senior CIA leadership—including Mr. Price and his Deputy John MacGaffin—on ongoing investigations. Mr. Price would certainly have shared such a serious concern with that group.
Moreover, had there been any suspicion about Mr. Redmond or any senior official, Mr. Price would have immediately met with his FBI counterpart to discuss a course of action.
Worth noting, this incident offers a clear example of how Ms. Bannerman and Mr. Baer seemed to think she operated outside of Mr. Curran’s chain of command in Counterespionage. Mr. Baer notes Ms. Bannerman’s frustration that Mr. Redmond and Mr. Curran pushed to have Ms. Webb attend the briefing which was for some reason a problem for Ms. Bannerman. Then they mischaracterize Ms. Webb “as an analyst with no CI experience” so in their view unnecessary baggage at Bannerman’s Matrix briefing for Mr. Price.
Mr. Baer fails to include the operative point that Ms. Webb was Mr. Curran’s Deputy Chief of Counterespionage at the time and Ms. Bannerman’s immediate supervisor. Ms. Webb was put in that position by Mr. Price and Mr. Redmond.
Ms. Webb had been Mr. Price’s Executive Assistant throughout the previous year leading to the Ames arrest, worked with Mr. Price on all the CI reviews and was a key player in designing the post Ames reforms.
After President Clinton signed PDD 24, Mr. Price assigned her to be Mr. Curran’s Deputy because he had confidence in her CI expertise, her successful track record working with the FBI on espionage cases and her experience working with senior CIA management including Mr. Price, the DCIA and DDCIA.
As well as she knew Mr. Price, Ms. Webb does not believe the briefing occurred as Ms. Bannerman described it to Mr. Baer. Ms. Webb stated that she, Mr. Curran and Mr. Turnicky met regularly with Mr. Price on various espionage cases—including SIU matters—and it is inconceivable he would have seriously considered Mr. Redmond a spy and then not done anything about that.
It is even more inconceivable Mr. Price would retire from the CIA four months later without telling anyone or doing anything; another false assumption by Ms. Bannerman used to frame Mr. Redmond.
Mr. Price is sadly deceased so cannot respond to this but his Deputy, John MacGaffin, was deeply involved in CIA-FBI post Ames counterintelligence reforms (at CIA and then at FBI Headquarters) and confirmed he never heard any discussion of Mr. Redmond as a match to the espionage leads.
Mr. MacGaffin was one of the named sources in Mr. Baer’s book discrediting allegations that Mr. Redmond was the 4th Man.
Mr. MacGaffin also reminded us that when he was promoted to Chief of CE Division in the 1991, Mr. Redmond asked for an appointment with Mr. MacGaffin his first day on the job and gave a comprehensive briefing on the evidence of an unidentified Russian spy in the CIA and the activities of the SIU.
He then requested Mr. MacGaffin’s operational help to recruit Russian CI sources—among other things—that led to the operation involving “Max” which resulted in the identification of Ames and eventually Hanssen and other spies in the US. Government. Hardly something a spy trying to protect himself would do.
The book talks about Mr. Redmond’s six memos to DDO Ted Price were part of his war of attrition on Ms. Bannerman and the SIU and the memos were his attack after the 1994 Briefing. (Pg 194-195).
Again, Bannerman and Baer provide a seriously false assumption about Mr. Redmond to fit the Fourth Man narrative. The memos from Mr. Redmond to Mr. Price reflected the consensus view of Bannerman’s management that Ms. Bannerman was withholding key source reporting as discussed above.
Mr. Redmond appropriately documented those concerns for the record and importantly to advise Mr. Price officially that there were serious and growing concerns of her withholding information from the FBI on ongoing espionage investigations.
The file with memos was apparently accidentally given to Ms. Bannerman when Mr. Price retired on very short notice in May 1995 and his secretary incorrectly returned the sensitive sealed envelope to Ms. Bannerman because Mr. Price kept the memos in a file with Ms. Bannerman’s name on it.)
Ms. Bannerman told Mr. Baer she destroyed the memos. She should have returned the memos to her management and then taken the opportunity to address and correct the problem. She did not.
In a further blatantly inaccurate, frankly bizarre assumption regarding Mr. Price, Mr. Baer wrote that Ms. Bannerman “had to wonder if Mr. Redmond had been instrumental in forcing Price out. Price never called for a follow-up briefing to January 1995.” Ms. Bannerman alleges she suspected Mr. Redmond had misled FBI agent Edward Curran into believing Max’s reporting had been deliberately withheld from him.
These are additional false assumptions by Ms. Bannerman incriminating Mr. Redmond. Mr. Curran saw Ms. Bannerman’s insubordination with his own eyes as did his two CIA Deputies and many others who shared these concerns regularly with Mr. Redmond.
Regarding Mr. Price’s unexpected retirement, he was sadly the victim of fallout from the Aldrich Ames political reviews, contrary to Ms. Bannerman’s false assumption that Mr. Redmond had engineered it.
It is inconceivable that Mr. Price would have allowed Mr. Redmond to stay in such a sensitive position for over four months if he truly believed Ms. Bannerman’s Matrix pointed to Mr. Redmond.
It is also inconceivable that Mr. Price would not have read the memos from Mr. Redmond regarding Ms. Bannerman for anything other than the serious alert they were: FBI Counterespionage Chief Edward Curran was raising the alarm that she was withholding counterespionage information from him and the other FBI investigators.