Mr. Baer and his principal sources fail to provide much if any focus on exculpatory factors which are critical considerations when evaluating possible subjects to resolve unknown subject espionage leads.
While a number of CIA officers in 1994—including Mr. Redmond—were considered on a matrix due to their access to possibly compromised operations, there were many carefully thought-out reasons they were not seriously considered.
Indeed after Ms. Bannerman was replaced as Chief of the SIU, an additional category was added by the SIU—in close coordination with the FBI—which included exculpatory factors so that investigators could either eliminate or better prioritize the most unlikely candidates.
These issues were, carefully considered by competent CIA and FBI investigators at the time and resulted in Mr. Redmond and others being eliminated as serious candidates. Unfortunately, Mr. Baer readily accepts Ms. Bannerman’s false assumptions and recollections all these years later.
Here are three key areas arguing against Mr. Redmond being the master spy as claimed in the book—there are others not appropriate for discussion here. They are particularly significant when reviewed with the false assumptions outlined in the previous section.
Access to the CIA’s Most Sensitive Operations
Mr. Redmond knew about CIA’s most sensitive operations and programs over decades and many of them would have presented an unacceptable risk to him were he indeed a spy.
For example, Mr. Baer discusses two KGB First Chief (overseas) Directorate (FCD) Directorate K (Counterintelligence) sources, Max and Adolph, in great detail. Mr. Redmond was aware of the identities of both from the beginning and played a leading role protecting these operations and tasking them to identify Russian penetrations of the CIA and USG.
A real spy would have been threatened by those sources and almost certainly would compromise them for self-preservation. In fact, senior FBI agent Robert Hanssen did compromise them and others to the Russians. Ames also compromised sources that were a threat to him. Mr. Redmond was aware of other very sensitive operations that remained viable.
For example, Mr. Baer mentions in his book the very successful FBI and CIA Russian Illegals operation in the US that ran for years until the Illegals were arrested by the FBI in 2010. He does not connect that Mr. Redmond was aware of the origins of that operation as well as other very sensitive operations which must remain in CIA classified channels.
Leader in Strong USG Counterintelligence Programs
Mr. Redmond’s leadership setting up the Agency’s first and second SIUs would have been unacceptably dangerous initiatives for anyone who was trying to protect themselves as an in-place spy.
And just because the first SIU reported to him that did not insulate him or anyone else. Any attempt to rationalize that any other way is nonsense. But—contrary to Ms. Bannerman and Mr. Baer’s claims—this was just one example of Mr. Redmond’s many successes improving the Agency’s CI posture.
Finally, contrary to Ms. Bannerman’s claim that Mr. Redmond tried to destroy CIA’s spy catching capability to protect himself, the record is clear that he did everything he could to strengthen it.
In addition to driving operations to recruit Russian CI sources who identified Moscow’s most sensitive operations inside the FBI and CIA and across the USG he had a strong legacy of recruiting, developing and mentoring some of the Agency’s strongest CI officers.
Mr. Redmond’s management of a complex operation and investigations to unravel the East German espionage cases after the fall of the Berlin Wall, was another spectacular Counterintelligence success.
There are countless other examples which dispute this ridiculous claim—such as incorporating many new elements into the strongest CI and Counterespionage program in CIA history—financial investigations, comprehensive audit, stronger partnership with Security are just a few.
After retiring from CIA, Mr. Redmond continued building strong CI programs across the US Government. Examples include leading the Hanssen Damage Assessment, managing intelligence programs at the Department of Homeland Security, working closely with Intelligence Oversight Committees, particularly HPSCI, advising the National Counterintelligence Executive and working on CI reviews for the National Labs at the Department of Energy.
Mr. Redmond had a successful career of building strong Counterintelligence programs across the US government and with our many foreign allies. Ms. Bannerman and Mr. Baer’s claim to the contrary is malicious lies.
CIA Leadership’s CI Focus
Had there been any concern whatsoever that Mr. Redmond matched lead information as Ms. Bannerman now claims, the details would have been briefed to senior CIA and FBI leaders, including Directors of both Agencies. It was not. Quite the opposite; Mr. Redmond participated in the most sensitive briefings.
Indeed, senior CIA leadership received regular but compartmented briefings and written reports on significant investigations and CI developments. Mr. Baer gives brief mention to a number of senior intelligence leaders who had told him they had never heard such a thing about Mr. Redmond and/or that it just wasn’t true. These important perspectives certainly don’t get the attention they deserved compared to Mr. Baer’s preferred sources.
Some of those very credible senior leaders who would have been in a position to know include—but are not limited to—
- Michael Sulick (Chief of Russian Operations, Chief of Station, Chief of Central Eurasia Division, Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence Associate Deputy Director for Counterintelligence and the Deputy Director for Operations, among other key assignments);
- Gina Haspel (former Director and Deputy Director of CIA, and Chief of Russian Operations);
- John MacGaffin, (former Associate Deputy Director for Operations and Chief of Central Eurasia Division);
- Former Director for National Intelligence James Clapper; and former DCIA Mike Hayden, to name a few.
.
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
Following we offer some fundamental questions an honest investigator—or journalist—with basic critical thinking skills would consider in evaluating Ms. Bannerman’s flawed assumptions implicating Mr. Redmond as a high-level KGB spy.
• Would Mr. Redmond have launched in 1991 the major espionage investigation that led to finding Ames—including inviting FBI into CIA to be part of the effort—and then enlist the operational support of new Chief Central Eurasia Division John MacGaffin to recruit Russian sources who could identify the mole?
• Would Mr. Redmond have created and asked Ms. Bannerman to lead a follow-on SIU tasked to pursue indications of more spies in addition to Ames and then significantly augment that unit to make it stronger?
• Would Mr. Redmond have pushed so aggressively to recruit and protect CI sources in Russian Intelligence who could identify penetrations of the CIA and elsewhere in the US Government?
Worth noting, in the early 1990s Mr. Redmond was often in conflict with his then boss and Chief of Central Eurasia Division, Milton Bearden, over the latter’s imposition of a moratorium on recruiting Russian intelligence officers now that—as Mr. Bearden saw it—the Cold War was over.
Mr. Baer actually describes this issue in his book and even points out that the conflict was one of the reasons Mr. Bearden eased Mr. Redmond out of the Central Eurasian Division. Mr. Baer fails to then make the obvious connection that, were Mr. Redmond a spy, he would certainly not have advocated the recruitment of KGB officers.
Fortuitously that conflict led to Mr. Redmond’s assignment to Deputy Chief CIC where he was in a position to create and manage the SIU which led to the identification and arrest of Ames.
• Would Ms. Bannerman have invited Mr. Redmond to attend the November 1994 Matrix briefing if indeed he was the only person who could have matched the lead elements on the matrix as she claims? It would be malpractice and perhaps obstruction of justice or worse had he really been a spy.
• If Ms. Bannerman and her two SIU colleagues felt so sure Mr. Redmond was the only match to the Matrix lead, why didn’t she document it in official channels to the FBI thru Mr. Curran—her immediate supervisor and the senior FBI agent responsible for managing espionage investigations in the CIA? Handwriting leads on a flip chart is not acceptable protocol for documenting and reporting espionage leads to the FBI.
• Is it credible to believe Mr. Curran would have ignored Ms. Bannerman’s alleged 1994 Matrix briefing in which she says Mr. Redmond was implicated as the obvious match for the spy and he stormed out when he knew the investigation was pointing to him?
• Similarly, why would DDO Ted Price—and Mr. Redmond’s senior—have ignored this following the alleged January 1995 briefing?
• Why would the dozens of other managers and investigators in CIA and FBI—who were intensely focused on resolving the espionage lead at the time—fail to follow up on her allegations?
• Why did Ms. Bannerman and Mr. Milburn support the FBI decision to open a full investigation on another Agency officer for the 1994-1995 Matrix lead to a senior penetration of the CIA rather than Mr. Redmond?
• During the FBI’s interview in 2006, Mr. Baer reports the unnamed FBI agent asked Ms. Bannerman why Mr. Redmond would have dismantled the SIU rather than tell them to keep digging when his job was to support continued investigations to find spies. Why didn’t Ms. Bannerman or Mr. Milburn provide a correct answer to the direct question from the FBI agent?
• Based on Mr. Baer’s book it appears they dishonestly answered this direct question from the FBI. Ms. Bannerman and Mr. Milburn both knew the SIU was never disbanded but rather greatly expanded and placed under new leadership. The SIU as an institution continued for many years with great successes but Mr. Baer, Ms. Bannerman and Mr. Milburn perpetuate the erroneous claim throughout Mr. Baer’s book that Mr. Redmond destroyed it to protect himself.
• Would Mr. Redmond have approved, encouraged and supported the $1.75 million post-Ames multi-faceted counterintelligence awareness program for the entire Agency that raised the level of understanding of and buy-in to CI across the CIA—to overcome the Angleton legacy?
If Mr. Redmond was a spy, wouldn’t it have been more advantageous for him to encourage the backlash against the Angleton area and ignore CI?
This large program consisted of two week-long advanced CI courses on spy cases and history—including one that spent a day learning lessons from the Angleton era, ethics and falsely accusing people as spies; one three-day course teaching case officers how to protect themselves overseas from foreign intelligence services; 100+ episodes of CI-TV aired on the internal TV system of CIA of CI documentaries and that encouraged people to read CI books; a CI information internal website; a CI/Security awareness survey of the Agency; multiple CI presentations in Bubble; CI marketing campaign across the Agency; training Career Trainee students, etc.)