A brief review of significant Counterintelligence history in CIA at the time is important to understand the deep flaws in Mr. Baer’s story.
In 1985, Aldrich Ames, a CIA officer working in Russian operations, volunteered to spy for the KGB. He passed a tremendous amount of classified information, including the identities of at least 10 Russians who were spying for the CIA. Some were brought back to Moscow and executed, others who refused to return to Moscow were resettled in the West. CIA’s Russia program was devastated.
It took some time—too much time in retrospect—for CIA to understand the magnitude of the losses and respond. Mr. Redmond was among the first to recognize there was very likely one or more spies in CIA’s Russian operations, citing numerous compromised operations as a sure sign of Russian penetration. While in CE division, he worked together with his management to impose draconian compartmentation to protect new Russian operations.
In 1991, he was assigned as Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Center (DC/CIC) and was dismayed to find there was no serious investigative work underway to resolve the source of the Russian compromises. He moved quickly to create a Special Investigative Unit (SIU) in CIA’s Counterintelligence Center (CIC) within the Directorate of Operations to identify the spy, including meeting with senior FBI management to invite their participation.
He was also instrumental—together with Mr. John MacGaffin, then the new Chief of Central Eurasia Division—driving critical new offensive operations to recruit and protect Russian intelligence sources who could identify the spies in the CIA.
The SIU—prior to the identification of Ames—reported to Mr. Redmond and included an FBI agent and analyst working with CIA officers who kept FBI officials informed. This unit was ultimately responsible for identifying Ames as a KGB spy in the CIA, leading to his arrest by the FBI in February 1994 and ultimately his conviction for espionage.
After the Ames arrest, the original SIU team moved on to other assignments in CIA or retired. But after Ames’s debriefing there were several compromised operations for which Ames did not seem responsible. That, combined with new source reporting, indicated indeed there were leads to other spies in the CIA and elsewhere in the USG.
As Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Center, Mr. Redmond created a new SIU in the spring of 1994 to review records, intelligence reporting, operations and identify unresolved leads to other spies. He asked CIA officer Laine Bannerman to serve as Chief of this new SIU where she and two other Agency officers served for over a year.
Meanwhile, following the exposure of the massive compromises to CIA’s Russian programs after the 1994 arrest of Ames, Congressional Oversight and senior officials in the White House were predictably angry over the tremendous damage, the length of time it took CIA and FBI to identify Ames and the fact Congressional Oversight had not been briefed on the compromises.
Tensions between the FBI and CIA grew to an all-time high. CIA officers conducted extensive reviews and lessons learned in CIA to identify internal mistakes and then introduce stronger Counterintelligence and Security programs.
The White House and Congress also conducted reviews and introduced directives for Counterintelligence, particularly a more collaborative relationship between CIA and FBI.
President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 24 (PDD-24) in May 1994 on US Counterintelligence effectiveness to foster increased cooperation, coordination and accountability among all US Counterintelligence Agencies.
Among other things, the PDD directed that a senior FBI Agent be permanently placed in charge of Counterespionage at the CIA. Mr. Edward Curran was assigned to the CIA in the summer of 1994 as the first senior FBI executive to fill that critical role. He reported to senior FBI leadership but also was responsible to the Director of CIA, other senior CIA leadership, and CIC management, including Mr. Redmond, on matters relating to espionage investigations.
Congress passed Section 811 in the FY 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act to improve Coordination of Counterintelligence Activities. In particular the legislation required that “the head of each Department or Agency in the executive branch ensure that the FBI is advised immediately of any information, regardless of its origin, which indicates that classified information is being or may have been disclosed in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”
In addition, it directed “The FBI is to be given complete and timely access to employees and records for their investigation.” Timely information sharing between CIA and FBI—while still protecting sensitive sources—had been a key irritant for both organizations and the post-Ames reforms were designed to address the past problems.
Mr. Curran, in his new Presidentially directed position, was expected to ensure all indicators of espionage were shared with the FBI and that espionage investigations received all necessary resources and support from both FBI and CIA.
To assist him, CIA leadership assigned two experienced CIA officers as Deputies to Mr. Curran: Ms. Lucinda Webb as Deputy Chief of Counterespionage for Operations and Mr. John Turnicky as Deputy Chief of Counterespionage for Security.
This management team had tremendous reach and capability to the fundamental areas for Espionage investigations—law enforcement, clandestine operations, security, and analysis. This management structure and other post Ames reforms provided access to all information, security tools, and other programs needed to design investigations and worldwide operations. The team regularly briefed senior CIC and Agency leadership on developments, investigations and any resource or policy needs.
Ms. Bannerman and the SIU was subordinate to that Counterespionage management team. Had she worked in support of that management structure and post Ames reforms, she would have solved the alleged issues/problems Mr. Baer claims she had. She did not, as is clear in numerous examples in the book. In the eyes of Ms. Bannerman’s Counterespionage management team, she failed to meet the requirements of the Legislation, the Presidential Directive and the extensive post Ames policy changes in CIA.
After over a year of increasing conflict with Ms. Bannerman’s management approach and an expanded number of espionage leads under investigation in CIA and the US Government, her immediate management in Counterespionage Group and Chief Counterintelligence—all below Mr. Redmond—decided to replace her in circa August-September 1995 after she asked to be taken out of Mr. Curran’s chain of command. That was the last straw on top of months of problems with her willingness to share all key source reporting with her management.
Also, FBI agents expressed great frustration working with her on ongoing espionage investigations.
Ms. Bannerman is the principal CIA source for Mr. Baer’s book and provides Mr. Baer with a series of assumptions (incorrect) and irresponsible analytic leaps (also incorrect) which she now says—28 years later—led her to conclude in 1994 that Mr. Redmond was a spy for the KGB. Contrary to the revisionist history in Mr. Baer’s book, she most certainly did not make this allegation —and facts to support it—nor document this for her management or the FBI at the time.
Most importantly, contrary to what Baer writes in his book, the SIU continued as an institution and in fact was significantly expanded with new more capable leadership, additional personnel and resources. Mr. Baer’s claim in the book that Mr. Redmond—or anyone else—disbanded the SIU because it was closing in on him is simply dishonest and his sources knew that. The SIU and its personnel and activities is extensively documented in CIA and FBI records.
In sum in 1994 FBI and CIA leadership—together with senior officials at the NSC and members of the Intelligence Oversight Committees—reviewed the numerous lessons learned from the Ames case and directed greater FBI-CIA collaboration in order to improve the US Government’s Counterintelligence ability to identify spies as quickly as possible.
Mr. Redmond worked tirelessly with Mr. Curran and others to create that improved relationship and to build a strong Counterintelligence Program in numerous areas across CIA.
The investigation of CIA officer Harold J. Nicholson—who volunteered to the KGB in February 1994 and was arrested by the FBI November 1996—provides an excellent case study of the success which came with the improved FBI-CIA relationship.
Mr. Curran, his Deputies, and Mr. Redmond were at the center of making that work, together with the new Chief of the SIU (who replaced Ms. Bannerman) and many FBI agents and CIA officers who embraced better collaboration.