30 November 1994 HPSCI Press Conference:
Members of the House Intelligence Committee discussed the findings of the committee’s report concerning the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) handling of the case of Aldrich Ames, a spy within the CIA.
Among other findings, they found that the CIA failed to keep the oversight committees properly informed and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also failed to solve the Ames case. They also suggested solutions to these problems. The report was unanimously approved by the committee after a nine-month investigation.
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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: THE ALDRICH AMES ESPIONAGE CASE
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives
November 30, 1994
Full Report: HPSCI Ames Report (pdf)
FORWARD
When Aldrich Ames’ espionage was revealed with his arrest in February 1994, the Committee determined that its responsibility to oversee intelligence activities would best be discharged through the conduct of a thorough, independent examination. This report concludes the Committee’s Inquiry.
The Committee’s efforts were undertaken in the knowledge that other investigations, by the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, would also be conducted. The Committee acknowledges the contributions made by these investigations, particularly in the development of an exposition of the facts in the Ames case. The findings and recommendations in this report, however, reflect the Committee’s assessment of those facts and do not rely upon the assessments of others.
The report places special emphasis on issues of concern to the Committee such as the effectiveness of counterintelligence and security activities conducted by the CIA, the roles of the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation in espionage investigations in general and this investigation in particular, personnel management in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, and the intelligence community’s compliance with statutory requirements intended to facilitate the conduct of the congressional oversight of intelligence.
SUMMARY
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence began its eight-month Inquiry into the Ames espionage case within days of Aldrich Ames’ arrest on February 21, 1994. In preparing its report, the Committee built upon the report of the CIA’s Inspector General (IG), which did a very good job of laying out the facts of Ames’ espionage and the intelligence community’s efforts to uncover it.
The Committee supplemented this with its own investigation, which turned out to be the most intensive and time-consuming of the Committee’s activities in 1994. The Committee conducted numerous hearings and briefings, over a hundred hours of interviews, and reviewed over twelve linear feet of materials. Additionally, the Chairman and Ranking Republican interviewed Aldrich Ames.
The Committee report does not recapitulate the facts established in the CIA IG report regarding Ames’ espionage or of the efforts to uncover him; rather, it concentrates on issues, facts, and findings which were outside the scope or in some way different from those of the IG’s report.
The Committee found:
(1) There were systemic weaknesses in counterintelligence which were exacerbated by Individual failures in conducting and managing the Investigation. The systemic dysfunction between the counterintelligence, security, and personnel systems In the mid-1 980s created the environment in which Ames was able to commit treason with little fear of detection.
(2) Those who had been given the responsibility for Investigating the 1985-86 losses of Soviet sources failed to keep senior Directorate of Operations managers and those above them in the Agency’s chain of command advised of critically important Information on leads which should have led to Ames’ identification and arrest perhaps several years prior to 1994. The Committee believes the case for management Inattention as portrayed in the CIA IG’s report needs to be evaluated in light of this failure.
(3) Senior Directorate of Operations managers adopted a laissez-faire supervisory style in managing the counterintelligence investigation, a shortcoming shared with FBI counterintelligence officials.
(4) There was a failure to coordinate between the investigators in the Counterintelligence Center and polygraph and security officials in the Office of Security.
(5) Elements of the Directorate of Operations (DO) culture contributed to weaknesses In the investigation. The Committee found that while the esprit d’corps of the DO contributes to the DO’s strong sense of mission, it also fosters attitudes which can be overly self-protective and insular.
(6) Although the Committee has praise for the CIA’s personnel standards, deficiencies in the personnel system were noted in this inquiry. With respect to Ames, the CIA was overly tolerant of mediocre performance and ignored behavioral problems.
(7) The CIA failed to keep the oversight committees fully and currently informed of the 1985-86 losses and of important developments in the efforts to determine their cause. This was despite several instances of pointed questioning by Committee members. The lack of notification extended to the end: neither the CIA nor the FBI advised the oversight committees of the investigation until shortly before Ames’ arrest.
(8) The Committee found that the FBI’s role in the unravelling of Ames’ espionage activities was inexplicably passive despite unprecedented openness and access to CIA files. Moreover, the Committee found uncertainty in the FBI regarding the threshold of evidence necessary for it to take over a counterintelligence lead from the CIA.
The Committee support. the dedicated men and women of the CIA who work, sometimes at great personal sacrifice, to produce intelligence second to none. While the Ames espionage history points to real and serious problems at the CIA, the Committee does not believe that these problems raise questions about the value of the organization. The Committee will work constructively with the Director of Central Intelligence and other Intelligence community leaders to rectify the various shortcomings which have been identified in ways which will not damage the CIA’s ability to perform its critical mission. In that regard, the Committee notes its support of the numerous remedial actions already undertaken by the DCI, and by the President through Presidential Decision Directive 24.
Read all:
HPSCI Ames Report (pdf)
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On PDF page 177, the DCI says this about Paul Redmond to Congress:
First, I am establishing the position of Special Assistant and Ombudsman for Counterintelligence and Security, and I have asked one of the individuals I have cited for his contribution in the Ames case — indeed I would give this individual the principal credit for the ultimate success of our efforts in catching Ames — to serve in that position. He will report directly to me. His mandate will be to oversee all aspects of counterintelligence reforms, including revisions in the polygraph program and coordination between security and counterintelligence.