Redmond letter to the New York Times Editor re Tim Weiner’s obituary of Ames

To the NYT Editor:

Reference front page 8 January 2026 NYT Times obituary of Aldrich Ames by Tim Weiner.

I retired in 1997 from CIA as head of Counterintelligence (CI) and was the person who in 1991 reinvigorated the investigation of source losses, putting together a Team of three CIA and two FBI officers; and drove, and managed their investigation which led to CIA’s identification of Ames as a spy.

Mr. Weiner’s piece contains error of fact and is spun in part to omit relevant facts: Winer emphasizes Ames was the Soviet Division’s CI “chief.” He never was. He was in charge of matters relating to Soviet (KGB and GRU) cases and not involved in equally productive and important penetrations of the other Warsaw pact intelligence services.

Mr. Weiner’s use of the word “liaisons” regarding CIA’s relationships with our penetrations of the KGB and GRU is misleading as we obviously dealt with sources clandestinely. To anyone who knows anything about the intelligence business “liaison” bespeaks a relationship with another, foreign intelligence service.

The statement that the 1989 lead about Ames’ wealth was delayed in passage to internal security is wrong. I personally received the information from the informant and within minutes referred her and her information to the appropriate office.

Using as hedge words a “formal criminal investigation” largely “spurred “by the FBI did not begin until 1993, Mr. Weiner implies CIA had been doing nothing. That is incorrect.

CIA members, all intelligence officers with CI and security experience, had concluded by analysis Ames was a spy. The two fully integrated FBI officers apparently disagreed. They sent a note to their Headquarters to that effect listing several other candidates.

They thus presumably delayed the criminal investigation which was not opened until later when CIA obtained from an in-place source information that the KGB had met a CIA officer at a specific time and place.

From our investigative/analytical knowledge of Ames’ activities he was immediately linked to the source information. That persuaded the FBI to open an investigation which, let the record show, the Washington Metropolitan Field Office conducted brilliantly.

In sum, without CIA investigation/analysis and source information it is possible there never would have been a criminal investigation of Ames.

Regarding the damage assessment, which was incompetently managed by a former Naval Intelligence officer: Mr. Weiner states that Ames’ memory was so damaged by liquor he could not recall the scope of his betrayal. That is incorrect.

From my contemporary knowledge and very recent discussions with involved CIA and FBI officers, it is clear he provided detailed, accurate and confirmed information. In fact, very recently his statements about the timing of his compromise of two important sources are considered so reliable it is cited as proof there was another spy in CIA as their compromises clearly predate when Ames says he betrayed them.

Paul J. Redmond
Marblehead, MA